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> abstract • Simulation theory and the-
ory theory are interaction accounts of 
theory of mind that have been neurocen-
trically characterized. A hybrid of these 
theories approximates the interaction 
theory of social cognition, and can be de-
scribed in an indexical-symbolic process-
ing framework.
« 1 » in the target-article, shaun Gal-
lagher argues against standard models of 
Theory of Mind (toM), namely the simu-
lation theory (st) and theory theory (tt) 
accounts, which are presented as neurocen-
tric accounts (Mirror neurons and toMM, 
respectively). instead, the author offers an 
“alternative phenomenological-enactive 
approach” (§41) that “rejects the idea that 
[humans] mindread the hidden mental 
states of others” (§41). While i agree that 
neuroscientists have aspired to reduce st 
and tt to circumscribed circuits or sys-
tems in the brain, i contend that st and tt, 
in terms of their original conception, have 
more similarity with the author’s phenom-
enological-enactive approach than there are 
differences. This is because both accounts 
are, nonetheless, premised on interaction 
principles between the self and the other, 
and the environment at large.
« 2 » according to tt, our knowledge 
of other minds is embodied in an explicit 
symbolic theory, with axioms and rules of 
inference, from which we may deduce what 
others know and want (Gopnik & Wellman 
1992). a main principle of this account is 
that theories of the mind are constructed 
through observation of the world (with the 
other at its center), and are subject to revi-
sions with newly incoming information. as 
such, these theories of the mind are a prod-
uct of a learning process that is facilitated 
through a brain-X environment interaction. 
in contrast, st contends that we mentally 
simulate others’ thought processes and feel-
ings, using our own mental state as a model 
of theirs (Harris 1992). Here too, the st ac-
count can be described in interactive terms 
since it is based on a state-matching system, 
which is common to the observer (self) and 
the observed (other). it can be argued that 
the mirror neurons, which are seen by many 
as a physiological basis for this account, 
confirm this interactive view, since these 
neurons make no distinction between self 
and other (Jeannerod 1999). it should be 
noted, however, that this conceptualization 
is different from the view of other theorists 
arguing that toM development depends on 
an innate ability or a specialized module or 
mechanism (Leslie 1992).
« 3 » However, it is important to ac-
knowledge that neither of these accounts 
is satisfactory to account for toM, as they 
use different informational units for the 
representation of the mind. The st uses 
the observable, or one might say indexical, 
information to build theories of the mind, 
whereas tt uses, at least at its base, symbol-
ic information. a hybrid of the two theories 
might approximate the author’s interaction 
theory, as this would merge both the indexi-
cal and symbolic fields upon which the in-
teraction theory appears to be based (§46). 
it also would align with developmental 
evidence the author uses in support of his 
interaction theory, according to which the 
child progresses from primary to secondary 
intersubjective relations (§42). This devel-
opmental progression can be construed as 
a shift from an indexical- to a symbolic-
based world of mental state representation 
(see Figure 1).
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Figure 1 • Symbol-index relationship and the development of theory of mind (ToM) repre-
sentations (modeled after Deacon 1998). Developmentally, ToM processing initially relies on 
indexical information and has been observed in children as young as two years of age (South-
gate, Senju & Csibra 2007). This continues to be the dominant mode of processing until four 
years of age, with symbolic processing only appearing in five-year-olds and older (Abu-Akel 
& Bailey 2001). This conceptualization is consistent with the view suggesting that the child’s 
understanding of false belief reflects an increase in her ability to use and generate symbolic 
representation (Karmiloff-Smith 1992), and with meta-analytic evidence revealing that saliency 
and temporal markers (i.e., indexical information) facilitate the success of younger children on 
ToM tasks (Wellman, Cross & Watson 2001).
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« 4 »  Moreover, like the interaction 
theory, the indexical-symbolic (or the st-
tt hybrid account) embodies the body-
brain-environment triad. Just like develop-
ment culminates in one’s ability to also use 
symbolic information to model the other’s 
mind, so the converse is correct when the 
brain or the body regresses. For example, 
compared to left-hemisphere-damage pa-
tients, right-hemisphere-damage patients 
had more difficulties with toM when pre-
sented with symbolic-laden questions, but 
these differences were no longer discern-
ible when the questions contained indexi-
cal information (siegal, Carrington & radel 
1996). similarly, individuals with congeni-
tal heart disease demonstrated difficulties 
with third-person (symbolic), but not first-
person (indexical) toM (Chiavarino et al. 
2015). While the contribution of the physi-
ological characteristics or the severity of the 
heart disease to these difficulties is yet to be 
ascertained, it has been suggested that these 
difficulties may also be due to environmen-
tal and emotive factors such as limited peer 
relationships and activities (Kovacs, sears & 
saidi 2005). in either case, regression in the 
body state can affect one’s abilities to draw 
on the full range of indexical and symbolic 
representations.
« 5 » all this considered, neurocentric 
accounts might have blurred the interaction 
premises of st and tt accounts. a hybrid of 
these accounts can be conceptualized within 
an indexical-symbolic processing frame-
work, akin to the premises of the author’s 
interaction theory of social cognition.
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> abstract • While acknowledging the 
important contribution of Gallagher’s in-
teractive approach to perception, agency 
and social cognition, I suggest that the 
second-person stance it brings forward 
is not sufficient to account for the way 
humans navigate the social world. One 
of the main characteristics of the dura-
ble, impersonal constraints proper to in-
stitutions might indeed be to bypass the 
second-person and trigger a subjectless 
third-person stance.
« 1 » Countering the reduction of so-
cial cognition to mindreading, shaun Gal-
lagher has persistently and convincingly 
argued that the most pervasive way of un-
derstanding others is not based upon the 
inferential work of competent observers 
but upon the first-person stance of actors 
who engage in the course of interaction 
with others.1 as Gallagher put it in his tar-
get article, such a first-person stance can 
be accounted for neither in individualistic 
terms, nor in neurocentric, infra-individu-
alist terms. against the solipsist view of the 
individual as independent from her physi-
cal or socio-linguistic environment, against 
the neurocentric view of the mind as being 
enclosed in the boundaries of the skull, Gal-
lagher’s interactive model posits the first-
person stance as dynamically produced via 
intersubjective attunements and ecological 
adjustments. By definition, such dynami-
cal adjustments are not reducible to a set 
of mechanisms contained within the indi-
vidual or the brain; they function as a ho-
listic system of interactions, as a body- and 
world-involving cycle in which agents par-
ticipate and which ensures the maintenance 
of “a shared, intersubjective world” (§41). 
1 | since Gallagher’s article is very general, 
my commentary will also take into account the 
main tenets of the embodied, phenomenologi-
cal approach or “interaction theory” that he has 
launched with his colleagues these last years.
